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Introduction 
 The ethnic composition of the Russian Federation is a product of centuries of 
colonization polices from both the imperial and Soviet governments.  Once the Russian 
state had solidified around a common national identity, it began expanding into new 
territories, often forcefully.  The tactics used by the Russian rulers were at times that of 
either pure colonizers or of modernizers who wanted to create complete cultural and 
religious unity and tolerance within their borders.  The changing administrative practices 
between the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, as well as the differences in policy 
within these two specific eras, prevented the stable construction of national memory and 
identity in the colonized areas.  When the Soviet Union dissolved, some of these 
territories regained the ethnic sovereignty they had lost to the Russians.  Others, however, 
were granted partial sovereignty within the newly created Russian Federation.  This 
nebulous political status created an interesting challenge for post-independence memory 
construction in these regions. 
 Traditionally, when territories gain independence from their rulers, a period of 
rampant nationalism follows.  These communities are attempting to legitimize their new 
governments on the basis of a common identity, and doing so often requires the 
construction of a shared history for all the inhabitants.  This creation of a new group 
memory often involves an act of intentional distancing from their rulers, wherein they are 
vilified and used as a rallying point against which citizens might unify.  Where the settled 
territories experienced culturally or religiously oppressive policies, there is a tendency for 
the creation of nationalist sentiment that is aggressively against the previous rulers’ 
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ethnic identity and culture.  In this way, the newly independent group’s identity is often 
defined by what it is not. 
 The semi-autonomous regions in the Russian Federation, however, did not have 
this ability to break cleanly from the Russians.  The legacy of Russian colonial and 
expansionist rule from the tsarist to Soviet period, and the current political relationships 
between the Russian center and its diverse regions, provides a unique environment for 
memory creation.  This is particularly true in the case of the Kazan Tatars, the majority of 
whom reside in the Tatarstan Republic.  This region became a part of the Russian Empire 
in the sixteenth century and has not possessed a greater amount of cultural and political 
sovereignty from the Russian state in over five hundred years. Even today, with the 
varying degrees of sovereignty that the Tatarstan Republic possesses, it still remains tied 
to the Russians and their culture.  This intertwined relationship between Tatar and 
Russian cultures resulted in Tatar memory construction that is used to advance a specific 
group of people, while still remaining in the political and societal paradigm established 
by their Russian rulers. 
 While living in Kazan, I was struck by the seeming ease with which the Tatar and 
Russian cultures coexisted.  The Tatar culture, comprised primarily of Islamic and Asian 
influences, does not easily meld with the traditional Orthodox culture of the Russians.  In 
other territories in the Russian Federation with sizable Islamic populations, particularly 
the Caucasus, there is outright conflict between these two groups.  Tatarstan, even during 
the brutal wars in Chechnya following the collapse of the Soviet Union, never 
experienced outright conflict between the two large ethnic groups.  Peaceful relations 
have remained between the Russians and Tatars despite the political upheavals in other 
    3
parts of the Federation.  However, this has not prohibited the Tatars from launching 
several nationalistic campaigns, which are designed to promote the importance of the 
Tatar national identity.  As a former traveler to the Tatarstan Republic, I was able to 
witness first-hand examples of modern day Tatar nationalist and memory construction. 
 I can clearly remember my first visit to the Kul Sharif mosque.  The guide, a 
Tatar, framed the history of this mosque in nationalistic language, with a true sense of an 
“us vs. them” mentality in regard to the Tatars and the Russians.  It was clear that the 
mosque symbolized the strength of Tatar memory and identity and was not something 
that the Russians could take part in.  However, the guide was then quick to point to the 
Orthodox Church that stood directly across from the mosque.  With great pride, she 
discussed how in no other place in the world could you see such structures so close to one 
another.  The implications were clear.  In less than five minutes, the theme of her speech 
had changed from nationalistic pride to peaceful coexistence with the Russians, who had 
just been described as conquerors and intolerant oppressors.  While it is clear that the 
Tatars have a sense of their own national memory, they also cannot completely erase the 
Russian presence in their history.  Studying sites of memory in Kazan, like the Kul Sharif 
mosque, better illuminates the multicultural memory construction that has occurred in 
this territory in the post-1991 world.  
 This paper will examine memory creation in the Tatarstan Republic by analyzing 
different sites that represent particular memorial or historical themes for the Tatars.  It is 
divided into four sections: a discussion of the field of cultural and historical memory 
studies, a history of the Russian rule of the Tatars and its effect on modern memory 
construction, the current political relationship between the Russians and the Tatars, and 
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finally, the sites of memory themselves.  Ultimately, the complex legacy of Russian rule 
in Tatarstan has forced the Tatars to deviate from traditional post-independence, 
nationalistic memory construction, in pursuit of a more appeasing approach when 
constructing their new national myth.   
Making Memory 
 Examining the collective memory of a given national group has in recent years 
become a popular method for analyzing a state’s past and present. National entities 
throughout history constructed societal memories and traditions in order to strengthen 
certain cultural or political values and legitimize their power.1  These constructed 
national memories were embodied in physical monuments and museums but also in more 
intangible ways.  For example, Americans possess a specific memory of the 
Revolutionary War, which creates a narrative around the themes of patriotism and 
freedom.   It is likely that the American collective memory of the Revolution and the 
actual events are inconsistent, but memory study is not concerned with historical 
accuracy per se. Memory constructions are paramount in the insights they can offer into a 
community or state’s specific culture and identity. 
 Scholars warn against placing too much emphasis on collective memory at the 
expense of attention to individual memories, or against assuming that individual 
memories simply mirror the general memory.2 All individual memories play a part in 
                                                
1 Eric Hobsbawm, The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 15-43. 
One such ‘invented tradition’ was the Scottish kilt. For centuries, the kilt was seen as a representation of a 
more barbaric period. However, the kilt was later adopted to symbolize national pride, as the Scots 
attempted to separate themselves from the dominant English culture. Today, the kilt is only associated with 
positive imagery in the Scottish psyche, even though this is a very recent development in the Scottish 
existence. This construction of memory and tradition occurs in all societies throughout history.  
2 Alon Confino, “Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method,” The American Historical 
Review 102, no. 5 (Dec 1997): 1397.  The Zionist tradition is an instance where the group memory is 
assumed to mimic individual memories of the Zionist participants. Confino discusses the fallacy in 
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shaping collective memory.3 Indeed, the process by which collective memories are 
formed is often as important as the memories themselves. As historian Alon Confino 
demonstrates in his discussion of German national memory, “memory operates in society 
through a multiplicity of social times, social experiences, and representations.”4 
 Martin Evans’ examination of French memory of the 1950s Algerian war is a 
groundbreaking example of the importance of focusing on the memories of individuals 
rather than of larger entities.5 Evans examines oral testimonies of a range of French 
citizens about their memories of their country’s war with Algeria. If only a collective 
memory approach is taken with this conflict, the narrative suggests that French citizens – 
as a collective - were patriotic and fiercely loyal to their government’s actions in the 
former colonial territory. The official French government narrative of this engagement 
was not of a colonial war, but rather of France’s preservation of its natural borders and 
defense of French identity in the face of Algerian terrorism.6  Evans presents a different 
view of events, as he interviews French citizens who were against the deployment of 
French troops to Algeria. At the time, any divergent views from the metanarrative created 
by French ideologues, was seen as unpatriotic. Evans’ attention to individual memory 
produces a counter-narrative of the French-Algerian war, wherein the French-Algerian 
war was not seen as a just war to keep possession of French territory, but as a war fueled 
                                                                                                                                            
supposing that a group as ideologically diverse as Zionist would have only one narrative. While the 
individual memories are subsumed to create the collective, it is a mistake to ignore this process in creating 
national memory. 
3 Confino, “Collective Memory and Cultural History,” 1400. 
4 Alon Confino, “Telling About Germany: Narrative of Memory,” The Journal of Modern History 76  (June 
2004): 408. 
5 Martin Evans, The Memory of Resistance: French Opposition to the Algerian War (1954-1962) (Oxford: 
Berg, 1997). 
6 Evans, 24. 
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by anachronistic colonial desires.  Without Evans’ attention to individual memory, the 
traditional narrative of this war may have gone unchallenged.    
 Scholars of historical or collective memory are also wary of focusing too heavily 
on elite memories over the memories of the “common person.”  The elites of society are 
more likely to construct memories or traditions that preserve or legitimize their power, 
ideologizing these memories for political ends. While the politics of memory has become 
a popular subject, especially in post-colonial or post-communist states, it too frequently 
takes the place of the cultural or social implications of memories.7 
 Confino offers a critique of top-down memory studies in his analysis of historian 
Henry Rousso’s work on memories of the Vichy regime.8  Rousso studies the 
mobilization of Vichy memories by political elites in post-war France.  He looks to the 
statesman Charles De Gaulle, the French Communist Party, and literary and cinematic 
representations of Vichy France, to analyze how Vichy memory was constructed and 
used in French society after the war.9  Confino criticizes Rousso’s reliance on only elite 
segments of the French population.  He points out that while elites are integral forces in 
memory construction, ignoring other segments of the population results in an incomplete 
picture.10  In some cases, examination of non-elites results in a completely different 
constructed memory.  
                                                
7 Kathleen Smith, Mythmaking in New Russia: Politics and Memory during the Yeltsin Era (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2002). Smith’s book examines  memory construction in post-Communist Russia. While it 
is an interesting exploration of the politics of remembrance and forgetting, it largely deals with Russian 
politicians and how they relate to the political history of communist Russia. It thus fails to include any 
discussion of cultural memory construction. 
8 Confino, “Collective Memory and Cultural History,” 1394. 
9 Henry Russo, The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France Since 1944 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1991). 
10 Confino, “Collective Memory and Cultural History,” 1394. 
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 The official memory of the Nazi period in Germany immediately after World War 
II involves a suppression of the past, a failure to ‘come to terms’ with it.  This may have 
been from the elite, political perspective, but studies conducted with individuals from this 
period demonstrate an entirely different picture. Many German citizens were active 
participants in remembering and interpreting the tragedies of the Holocaust.11  While 
elites wield a strong influence over how the lower classes interpret different events, a 
total reliance on them in memory studies can sometimes be misleading. 
 Finally, scholars caution against artificially separating memory from history. 
When memory and oral history were first used as scholarly sources, many were quick to 
claim that memory was not the same as history. History was seen as the more stable, 
accurate force, whereas memory was viewed as a fluid construct that was not as reliable 
as history. More recently, scholars have argued that memory shapes history, and vice 
versa, and that a strong interdependence exists between the two concepts.12  In the 1920s, 
Maurice Halbwachs, a French sociologist and theorist of memory studies, noted that 
memory is a socially constructed concept, whose purpose is to support events in the 
present, as opposed to actually depict the events of the past.13 The same can be said of 
history, which is constantly being revised or changed to a given end.  Thinking of history 
as a rigid, immovable construct fails to grasp the fluidity of history. The link between 
memory and history is undeniable. To ignore it is to lower the value that memory can 
                                                
11 Robert Moeller, War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001): 1-20. Moeller analyizes the various West German 
methods for interpreting the war.  Following the events of 1945, West Germans needed a lens through 
which to view the actions of their political leadership, in a way that did not frame them as complacent in 
the atrocities of the Holocaust.  As Moeller describes, while some Germans did not fully expunge the 
Holocaust from their collective memory, the major focus of this memory was the victimization of the 
Germans at the hands of the invading Soviet army or the Nazi party. 
12 Natalie Davis and Randolph Starn, “Memory and Counter-Memory,” Representations  26 (Spring 
19898): 6. 
13 Davis and Starn, 5. 
    8
have in illuminating societal constructs, and the motivations behind promoting one 
history over another. 
 For the purposes of this paper, I will examine three analytical methods used in 
memory studies: oral history, group study, and monument analysis. Oral history is the 
most commonly used methods affording access to memory.  The oral history interview 
relies on living subjects who experienced the actual events being studied. As already 
noted, Evans’ work on the French-Algerian war utilizes oral interviews with average 
French citizens, to gather reflections on the engagement with France’s former colonial 
possessions.14 Oral history allows individuals from a society to express their 
remembrances, often as an active part in a generalized narrative.15  It provides an 
individualized view of events, with information and viewpoints from all segments of the 
population. 
 While oral history, because of its first hand recounting of memory, may be the 
most desirable of all the potential forms of study, it is also the most complex. 
Notwithstanding the logistical implications of conducting them, oral interviews evolve 
with the fluidity of memory. What one interviewee remembers about an event will 
change with each passing year, as new details emerge and old ones are forgotten, making 
the maintenance of oral history difficult to sustain over significant periods of time. 
 Pieter Lagrou uses group study as a method to examine memory construction of 
post-war France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Lagrou claims that the trauma of 
occupation did not allow these countries to create a cohesive narrative of the Second 
                                                
14 Evans, 3. 
15 Nathan Wachtel, "Memory and History: An Introduction," History and Anthropology 2 (1986): 207. 
    9
World War.16  Instead of looking at the general to understand memories of the war, 
Lagrou examines specific segments of the population, namely the resistance movements, 
victims of persecution, and forced labor conscripts.17 Lagrou defends his decision to 
focus on specific groups’ memories, as opposed to the memories of the “silent majority,” 
by claiming that no such concept existed in these societies.18  Confino was particularly 
impressed by Lagrou’s methods, because it demonstrates that a society can have varying 
viewpoints on significant historical events.19  While Lagrou’s methods were pertinent to 
disordered occupied territories, these divisions in society are not always applicable in 
memory studies, simply because they do not always neatly exist. 
 A third form of memory study is the interpretation of national monuments. This 
can include museums, libraries, statues, important historical figures, or a variety of 
symbolic entities, even dates, which come to be revered by the broader population.  
These sites are a more recent tool of memory studies, as French historian Pierre Nora 
outlines in his major works. He argues that modern society’s need to create tangible 
markers of history is evidence of the erosion of the difference between history and 
memory.20  If history were a more stable concept in this present age, there would be no 
need to physically mark or commemorate events.  However, the presence of these sites 
provides a window into how a society chooses to construct its own national narrative. 
 Scholars examine the issues and purposes surrounding the construction of these 
sites, and from this extrapolate the meaning each constitutes in the national identity. This 
                                                
16 Pieter Lagrou, The Legacy of Nazi occupation: patriotic memory and national recovery in Western 
Europe, 1945-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 6.  
17 Lagrou, 4. 
18 Lagrou, 6. 
19 Confino, “Telling About Germany,” 403-404. 
20 Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire,” Representations 26 (Spring 1989): 
12. 
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method is particularly applicable to post-colonial states. Upon gaining independence 
from their colonial rulers, these newly free states seek to establish new memories and 
traditions, which will connect their present incarnation with that which existed prior to 
colonization.21 Building sites of memory is the quickest and simplest method for 
constructing a new national identity. 
 Focusing on such sites of memory as a way of examining national identity carries 
the danger of focusing too much on top-down constructions. Since elites generally 
construct these sites, using them for historical analysis invites the risk of disregarding the 
memories of the lower level of societies. However, this possibility is somewhat avoided 
by including an examination of how the common people identify and relate to each site of 
memory. In this way, the top-down and bottom-up perspectives are both included in the 
analysis. 
Tatars as a Subject Population 
 The national development of Tatarstan, first under Imperial Russia and then 
Communist Russia, are events that modern Tatars have attempted to rewrite in order to 
legitimize their newly gained partial independence from the Russian state.  Examining 
the history of Russian rule over the Tatars helps to understand why the modern Tatars are 
practicing a particular form of memory construction.  Often, when discussing Russian 
expansion outside of the traditional borders of the Muscovite state, many scholars are 
quick to label these actions as colonization.  It is clear, however, that the ultimate goal of 
the Russian tsars was not pure colonization, but rather to form a modern multi-ethnic 
state.  The same can be said of the Soviet Union and its leadership, who are also often 
mislabeled as colonizers.  While the modernizing policies of imperial and Soviet Russia 
                                                
21 Nora, 7. 
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were frequently brutal and repressive, it would be incorrect to liken them to the colonial 
actions of the other European powers at that time.  This has created a complex 
relationship between the Tatars and the Russians, which lacks a clear delineation between 
a colonizer and a colonized group.  The sites of memory constructed in Tatarstan after 
1991 further emphasize the complicated history between these two groups.  Further 
exploring the impact of Russian rule over the Tatars, will help better elicit why these sites 
of memory are an attempt to break from the tsarist and Soviet past, but not an outright 
denial of Russian cultural influence on the Tatar community.    
Russian Expansion and its Impact on Tatar National Development 
 Russian expansion and accumulation of territory was never a uniformly applied 
endeavor. Variations of colonizing and settlement practices existed throughout the Tsarist 
and Soviet periods, as each new leader developed different strategies for dealing with the 
multi-ethnic Russian state. The Tatars experienced different expansionist tactics 
beginning with the fifteenth century Kazan Khanate and leading up to the twentieth 
century Tatarstan Socialist Republic. As a now sovereign group in the Russian 
Federation, the Tatar people have attempted to construct a cohesive national identity of 
long standing for themselves. However, inconsistently implemented imperial and 
communist polices, and their legacy on Tatar development, have severally hampered the 
creation of a stable identity. Examining the fluctuating Russian policy to the Tatars, 
demonstrates the modern difficulty faced by this ethnicity to successfully assert a 
nationalist sentiment. 
Tatars during Imperial Rule  
    12
 The Kazan Khanate first emerged following the decline of the Mongol Golden 
Horde.  Civil strife amongst the Mongol khans had severelly weakened the Horde’s grasp 
over the Muscovy Grand Dukes and the surrounding territories.22 The Tatar Mongol Ulu 
Muhammed took advantage of the instability caused by the inner power struggle of other 
Mongol leaders, and established a Kazan Khanate. Muscovy officially recognized the 
legitimacy of this khanate after Muhammed defeated and captured its leader Vasilii II in 
1445. Together they created a pragmatic relationship, where both states were able to 
influence the other’s politics and they became strong economic and military allies.23 
Consequently, the balance of power was constantly shifting between Muscovy and Kazan 
throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.24 However, Muscovy increasingly came 
to view the Tatars as ethnically and culturally inferior, causing them to redefine their 
relationship and move away from the traditional regional diplomacy. 
 To undermine the position of the Khanate and as a result gain more control over 
it, the Muscovite leadership attempted to influence the political situation in Kazan, by 
promoting rulers who were friendly to Muscovy.25  This political influence was later used 
as support for the Russia takeover of the Khanate.  For example, Ivan III’s assistance 
with moderating a dynastic succession debate was later used as Muscovites’ evidence of 
their ownership of the territory.26 Still, Muscovy was unable to completely control the 
Kazan Tatars. Instead, it remained immersed in the politics that had guided its 
relationship with the Khanate since Ulu Muhammed’s rule. Ivan IV would briefly 
                                                
22 Charles Halperin, The Tatar Yoke (Ohio: Slavica Publishers, 1985), 149. 
23 Janet Martin, Medieval Russia, 980-1584 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 319. 
24 Edward Keenan, “Muscovy and Kazan: Some Introductory Remarks on the Patterns of Steppe 
Diplomacy,” Slavic Review 26, no. 4 (Dec 1967): 554. 
25 Andreas Kappeler, The Russian Empire: A Multiethnic Empire (New York: Longman, 2001), 25. 
26 Jaroslaw Pelenski, “Muscovite Imperial Claims to the Kazan Khanate,” Slavic Review 26, no. 4 (Dec 
1967): 561. 
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abandon these traditional practices in favor of more aggressive tactics. This allowed him 
to conquer the Kazan Khanate, changing Muscovy into a multi-ethnic empire, as well as 
overturning steppe diplomacy.27 Eventually, Ivan would return to the pragmatic 
relationship with Kazan, but not before the territory was integrated under Muscovy’s rule. 
 When Ivan IV came to power, Muscovy was at the height of its regional power.28 
At first, Ivan was content with continuing the relationship with Kazan established by 
previous Muscovite rulers. However, when a favorable Khanate was rejected in Kazan, 
Ivan chose to exert his authority and forcefully subdue the region.29 Even though 
Muscovy had always considered the Khanate beholden to them, direct action had never 
before been deployed. To legitimize Ivan’s actions, Muscovite leaders developed the 
theory for gathering the lands of the Golden Horde.30  This explanation for their rights to 
the Khanate allowed Muscovy to abandon the traditional political relationship with the 
Khanate in favor of outright colonization in Kazan and other territories in the former 
Mongol Empire. 
 The newly adopted Muscovite historiography argued that the Kazan Khanate had 
once been a part of the ancient lands of Rus’ ruled by Grand Prince Riurik and his 
successors. Therefore, Muscovy was entitled to claim the Golden Horde territory that 
historically had belonged to the Russian people.31 Ivan’s military campaign in Kazan was 
therefore viewed as a natural continuation of Rus’s history. 
 Ivan IV’s procurement of the Kazan Khanate was also grounded in an argument 
for the dominant influence of the Orthodox Church in Russian affairs.   The tsar’s 
                                                
27 Kappeler, 22. 
28 Keenan, 556. 
29 Keenan, 557. 
30 Pelenski, 560. 
31 Pelenski, 565. 
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religious advisors asserted that the Russians had a Christian duty to spread their religion 
to the Muslim Kazan Khanate.32 Russia’s relationship with the vestiges of the Mongol 
Empire was rooted in religious sentiment, because of the over two centuries of Islamic 
dominance under the Mongol yoke. It seems natural that Muscovy religious leaders 
would desire to restore authority to the Orthodox Church by subjugating the previously 
dominant Islamic religion. While the Muscovite rulers briefly applied a policy of forced 
religious suppression to the Khanate, it was eventually abandoned for more pragmatic 
policies. 
 One of Ivan’s first actions after conquering the Khanate of Kazan was to raze its 
largest mosque. In a highly symbolic move, an Orthodox Church named the 
Blagoveshchenskii Sobor was erected on the sight where the old mosque once stood.33 
This action reveals the accepted moral superiority of the Orthodox religion over Islam, 
and by an extension, the superiority of the Russian people over those residing in the 
Khanate. Many religious figures linked the victory in Kazan to divine retribution for the 
earlier actions of the Mongol invaders.34 Powerful religious leaders like Metropolitan 
Makarii exerted their influence over Ivan IV to attack the Islamic faith and increase 
Orthodoxy’s power.35  
 To bolster Muscovy’s religious claim to the Khanate, religious myths were 
developed that praised Muscovy’s actions in conquering the Khanate. One of the most 
famous tales to originate from this period involved the appearance of an icon depicting 
the Virgin Mary. The icon was revealed to the Christian people in Kazan, after a fire 
                                                
32 Katerine Graney, “Making Russia Multicultural: Kazan at its Millennium and Beyond,” Problems of 
Post-Communism 54, no. 6 (Nov/Dec 2007): 21. 
33 Graney, 54. 
34 Pelenski, 572. 
35 Kappeler, 27. 
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broke out in the city.36 Several miraculous events have been attributed to the icon, as it 
still maintains a revered position in Russian religious mythology. 
 Mass conversions were another method used by Ivan IV and his advisors to 
solidify their religious claims on the Volga region.37 The Islamic Tatars and other ethnic 
groups residing in the Khanate were viewed as inferior to the Orthodox Russians, and 
conversion was seen as the only avenue for them to reach enlightenment.38 The 
Archpriest of the Annunciation Cathedral claimed that it was necessary “to convert 
pagans to the Orthodox faith even if they do not desire it…so that all the universe should 
be permeated with Orthodoxy.”39 Religious fervor was a clear motivator for Muscovy’s 
actions in the Khanate, as different Orthodox leaders encouraged Ivan IV to frame his 
expansion into the Volga as divinely inspired. In response to the Russian incursions into 
the Islamic faith, there were widespread Tatar uprisings. This forced Muscovy to 
reconsider its treatment of the region and adopt more pragmatic methods that would help 
define later policies towards other colonized nationalities.40 
 There was understandable opposition to conversion, and the Russians were met 
with strong resistance from the Tatars and other groups. This forced Muscovy to lessen 
its religious zeal and instead adopt a more appeasing policy. In 1555, conversion was 
abandoned and a modicum of religious tolerance was allowed to exist in the Khanate.41 
However, religious concessions were not sufficient in quelling opposition. Compensation 
in the political as well as economic realms was required to create the peaceful and 
                                                
36 Pelenski, 573. 
37 Kappeler, 27. 
38 Pelenski, 574. 
39 Pelenski, 575. 
40 Kappeler, 28. 
41 Kappeler, 27. 
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dependent relationship Moscow desired with the Volga territory. Muscovy rewarded the 
Khanate elites with these concessions, as a way to curry favor and support for 
colonization. This technique would later serve the Russian Empire as it expanded its 
borders in all directions. 
 Since the political and economic structures of Muscovy and the Khanate were 
roughly equivalent, the Muscovite leaders chose to rely on the Khanate elites for 
assistance. In return, the elites were given the ability to govern independently, while still 
under the purview of Muscovite rule. Since the elites of the Kazan Khanate’s society 
were predominantly Tatar, they were given preferential treatment and seen as equals by 
Muscovy.42 Non-elites, often from other ethnic groups like the Chuvash and Cheremis, 
were expected to abide by the established Mongolian tax system and continue paying 
their iasak (tax). Instead of going to the leaders in Kazan, the tax now went directly to 
Moscow.43 
 Following the events of 1552, the Muscovite state had briefly tried to alter the 
Tatar culture. With the colonization of the Kazan Khanate, Ivan and his advisors desired 
to refashion what the Tatar ethnicity represented, mostly through religious conversion. 
Their failure is evident in the later return to more conciliatory policies, and the 
preservation of traditional Tatar culture. Still, the Tatar identity had changed in some 
ways because of Muscovy’s colonization of the Golden Horde territories. The Tatars 
could no longer define themselves as the successors to the Mongol Empire, because the 
Muscovite leaders had claimed this position.  Starting with Dmitrii Donskoi’s defeat of 
the Mongol leader Mamai in 1380 to Ivan IV’s annexation of the splintered remains of 
                                                
42 Kappeler, 25. 
43 Kappeler, 30. 
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the Golden Horde, Muscovy pushed to replace the Mongols as rulers in the region.  The 
Tatar’s defeat at the hand of Ivan IV severed their historical connection to the Golden 
Horde, and by extension the Kazan Khanate, as the Tatars were incorporated into the 
larger Muscovite state. Later Russian activity in the Kazan region would further erode the 
Tatar national character, as other imperial leaders broke with the relationship model 
practiced by Ivan IV’s government. 
 The practical economic and political Tatar colonization policies established by the 
Muscovite state dampened the threat of revolt in the Volga region. While there were 
sporadic instances of violence, the area was mostly incorporated into the Russian state by 
the seventeenth century.44 Still, much was unknown about the territory, and threat of 
future violence was a detriment to Russian leaders launching full-scale colonization 
activities.45 Peter the Great’s ascendsion to the throne however, reversed established 
Russian policies to the Tatars.  Inspired by the achievements of the Western empires, 
Peter was determined to refashion Russia into a more European state. This required that 
the empire be transformed into a more uniform, cohesive entity. To do so, Peter 
abandoned the established pragmatic measures, and returned to more assertive colonizing 
activities regarding religion and social restructuring. 
 A major policy reversal involved rescinding religious tolerance. Once again, the 
Russian state encouraged conversion to Orthodoxy, often in exchange for monetary 
compensation.46 Baptism was encouraged with bribery, and a number of minority ethnic 
groups in the former Khanate ostensibly converted.47 In addition to economic pressure, 
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the Russian state tried more destructive measures to eradicate the influence of Islam.  A 
staggeringly high number of mosques were destroyed in the religious campaign in an 
attempt to force the Volga peoples away from Islam.48 
 Previously, the Muscovite state had relied on non-Russian elites as allies. Under 
Peter, however, elites were no longer viewed as equals. Peter redefined the entire political 
structure, in an attempt to create a more uniform state.  In an effort to promote conversion 
to Orthodoxy, the upper class Muslim Tatars were told to convert or risk losing their 
property.49 The non-Russian lower classes that had previously received separate 
treatment from the Russian peasants were also not immune to Peter’s reorganization. All 
peasants were grouped in the same social class, regardless of their ethnic background. 
This action further blurred the divisions between the various ethnic groups of the former 
Kazan Khanate. 
 The eighteenth century colonization activity denotes the first true mixing of Tatar 
and Russian cultures. Unlike during the Muscovite period, when the Tatar identity was 
allowed to maintain its independence, Peter forced the Tatars to share the Russian 
national religion and culture. He also removed the barriers separating Russian and Tatar 
lower classes, further steeping the Tatars in the Russian nationality. The Tatar national 
identity was being sacrificed, in effort to create a unified Russian nationality. This was 
reversed under Catherine II, who returned to the pragmatic expansionary policies of the 
pre-Petrine era. Her liberal policies encouraged an era of Tatar enlightenment, which led 
to the rebirth of Tatar identity and the development of the modern Tatar nation.  
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 Catherine’s earlier experiences as the Russian leader affected her later policies 
towards the Kazan region. After coming to power, Catherine endured a bloody 
insurrection of southern Cossacks, known as the Pugachev Rebellion. The rebellion was a 
reaction to the modernizing attempts of the Russian state, and was led by the Cossacks 
with strong peasant support.50 Even though the uprising eventually stagnated as peasant 
support wavered, it was understood that the potential for another such event was great. In 
order to prevent this from occurring, Catherine granted the Cossack elites certain 
privileges, making them compliant to the Russia state.51 The lesson Catherine gained 
from this brief instability was to rely on societies elites to maintain order throughout the 
empire, which she later applied to the Tatar aristocracy in Kazan. 
 In the wake of the Pugachev Rebellion, it was obvious that reform of the Russian 
colonization policy was needed. In a move to restructure the Russian law code, Catherine 
convened the Legislative Commission with several representatives from across the 
empire.52 Tatar support during the rebellion gained them representation in this national 
body, in which they expressed their desire for greater religious freedom and a reversal of 
Peter’s harsh policies for Tatar elites.53 Sympathetic to their plight, Catherine encouraged 
the development of Tatar religion and trade, which flourished up until the revolutions in 
1917, and established the ethnic structure in the former Khanate that is still reflected in 
the modern Tatarstan Republic. 
 With Catherine, the oppression of the Islamic religion was curtailed. Shortly after 
the first meeting of her Legislative Commission, Catherine granted the request for 
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building new mosques in Kazan, the first erected since the Russian occupation of 1552.54 
This act encouraged Tatar Muslims to continue pressing the Tsarina for concessions 
towards Islam. Acquiescing to their demands, the Tsarina passed the Act of Tolerance for 
Muslims in Russia, which offered the numerous Muslim practitioners a modicum of legal 
protection in the Russian Empire.55 Greater freedoms led to an increased religious debate 
amongst the Tatar Muslims, as many in the intelligentsia began constructing a historical 
Tatar identity. 
 With the revival of Islam, the Tatar elites desired to increase their legitimacy by 
creating an unbroken connection from their eighteenth century existence to the precursor 
of the Kazan Khanate, the Volga Bolghar state. Historical claims were made that the 
Tatars were descendants of the Bolghar state, which had converted to Islam in 922 and 
was situated around the city of Kazan.56 By positioning themselves as the successors to 
this Islamic state, the Kazan Tatars were establishing themselves as a powerful political 
and religious entity. As the Empire extended into Central Asia, the Kazan Tatars utilized 
their similar culture and language to promote their leadership over Russia’s Muslims and 
to revolutionize Islamic education.57 
  After Peter’s restrictive measures towards Islam, religious education had faltered. 
Most Tatars turned to Central Asia and its Bokhara schools for theological instruction. 
However, once Catherine lifted Peter’s bans, an outpouring of religious reform occurred.  
The Tatar Shihabeddin Merdzani spearheaded a campaign to overturn the traditional 
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conservative instruction of the Bokhara schools in favor of more progressive teachings.58 
One of his pupils named Hussein Feizhani modernized Islamic education further, by 
promoting more progressive and reformist tenets. His teachings soon became the standard 
of all Tatar theological institutions.59  
 Literary scholarship also flourished with the lessening of religious restrictions. 
For the first time, copies of the Koran were widely disseminated. There was a strong push 
by Tatar intellectuals to publish religious texts in the vernacular Tatar language.60 The 
move to use the Tatar language in print advanced the formation of secular journals and 
newspapers. The majority of these publications were located in Kazan. With this, the 
center of Muslim scholarship shifted from Central Asia to Kazan, making it one of the 
most prominent Islamic cities in the world.61 This also gave the Tatars residing in the area 
undue influence over other ethnic Muslim groups in the Russian Empire, which was only 
bolstered by their economic prosperity. 
 Aside from lessening religious restrictions, Catherine also allowed the Tatar 
aristocracy to regain trading rights. Under Peter, Tatars and other non-Russian elites were 
barred from residing in Kazan. By allowing them to return to the economic center, 
Catherine authorized Tatar dominance in eastern trading.62 The already close cultural ties 
between Central Asia and the Tatars made establishing trade relationships simpler, 
allowing the Tatars to eliminate other foreign competition in the Central Asian markets. 
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Kazan resumed its role as a center of economic trade, a position that the Tatar nobles had 
promoted under khanate rule.63 
 The Tatars became the Russian government’s trade emissaries in the eastern parts 
of the empire. Windfall profits were accrued by the Kazan Tatars, as the city’s influence 
spread throughout Central Asia and Siberia. This inevitably led to the Tatarization of 
different ethnic groups, including those groups from the original Kazan Khanate, the 
Chuvash and the Mordivinians.64 Influential Tatar leaders began pushing for unification 
of all Turkic peoples residing in the Russian Empire. Presumably, the Kazan Tatars 
would use their power to lead the other Turkic ethnicities in a national movement. The 
threat of such an event worried the Russian state, and as a result, Tatar merchants were 
replaced with Russians. Kazan’s grip on eastern trade slowly diminished throughout the 
nineteenth century.65  
 The religious, political, and economic authority that the Kazan Tatars were able to 
accumulate under Catherine II helped to solidify their national identity. Not since the 
Khanate period had the Tatars been able to so freely express their religious or cultural 
beliefs.   This strong nationalist expression, however, was diminished by the continued 
dominance of the Tatars by the Russians. Even though Catherine had loosened cultural 
restrictions, the Tatars remained beholden to the Russians for their ability to formulate a 
national identity. Aware of the potential risk a strong nationality could pose, the Russian 
state maintained strict control of their territorial possession.   Their pragmatic approach to 
administering non-Russian territories, allowed the Russian rulers to grant some 
allowances of cultural and political independence to their multi-ethnic subjects.  
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Unfortunately, the pragmatic approach of their colonial practices also allowed the 
Russians to stamp out any signs of nationalist uprising, when it threatened Russia’s 
control over its empire.   
 These pragmatic policies prevented a cohesive colonial strategy from developing, 
demonstrated in the divergent practices of Peter I and Catherine II.  This severely 
undermined any organic development of a Tatar national consciousness.  The Tatar 
culture was either harshly suppressed under Russian rule, or it was given the opportunity 
to flourish.  Moments of cultural revival were often followed by periods of repression and 
religious intolerance to any markers of Islam.  The Tatars were never permitted to have 
any permanent cultural identity; it was constantly fluctuating based on the colonial 
decisions of the Russian state.  At some points, it even seemed as if the Tatars were not 
colonial subjects, but near equals to the Russians in an expansive multi-ethnic empire.  
Catherine and other tsars’ allowance of Tatar elites to hold prominent political positions, 
give the impression that the relationship between the Tatars and the Russians did not 
always follow that of the traditional colonizer, colonized roles.  It is unsurprising then, 
that the Tatar identity that emerged from the Russian imperial period was fragmented and 
ill defined.  The Soviet style of governance that replaced imperial rule only helped to 
further fracture the Tatar identity. 
Tatars Under the Soviets 
 When the Bolsheviks seized power in the early part of the twentieth century, 
many of their policy decisions were made with the purpose of distancing themselves with 
the authoritarianism of the tsars.  In the early stages of the revolution, primarily to gain 
support from the ethnic masses, the Bolsheviks called for self-determination amongst the 
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non-Russian populations across the empire.  However, any ideas of self-determination 
were abandoned once the Bolsheviks achieved firm control of the country.66  Lenin and 
his supporters recognized that allowing the different territories in Russia to practice self-
rule, would drastically shrink the country’s borders and leave it vulnerable to outside 
forces.  Still, to continue the practices of imperial Russian to the non-Russian subjects, 
would unfavorably link the Soviets with a colonial power.  To rectify this issue, the 
Soviets developed a nationalist policy that would inform how non-Russian territories, like 
Kazan, would be administered for the greater part of the Soviet Union’s existence.  
 The debate over what degree of self-determination should be permitted in the 
Soviet Union split the fledgling government into two camps.  Detractors of self-
determination, the internationalists, felt that any form of nationalism was irrelevant, and 
that the Soviet leaders should simply focus on building class-consciousness amongst the 
population.67  Stalin and Lenin, however, both supported self-determination as a method 
of nation building in the non-Russian communities.  They both felt that nationalism was a 
distracter from class identity politics, but as part of the dialectics of history, it could not 
be stopped.68  Since Lenin viewed nationalism was inevitable, by controlling its 
development within the confines of the Soviet Union, he hoped to redirect nationalist 
sentiment towards supporting the new communist government.  The phrase, “national in 
form, socialist in content,” describes the goals of the early Soviet Union and their 
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nationalist policies.69  Nationalism was permitted, so long as it ultimately helped 
legitimize the political ideology of the Soviet Union throughout the region. 
 Despite the acceptance of his nation building policies, Lenin still feared 
continuing the oppressive policies of the tsarist state towards the non-Russians of the 
Soviet Union.  His “Greater Danger Principle,” warned that Russian chauvinism towards 
different ethnic groups was more dangerous than the local nationalism he wanted to 
promote in those areas.70  This led to formation of a policy called korenizatsiia or 
indigenization, wherein affirmative action was used to bring in non-Russians as part of 
the Soviet Union’s administrative structure.71  As the second largest ethnic group in the 
Soviet Union, the Tatars were one of the main targets of korenizatsiia.72  The strategy of 
affirmative action lasted until Lenin’s death and Stalin’s rise to power in the late 1920s.73  
For that brief time, the Tatars underwent a second cultural revival, similar to the one that 
occurred during Catherine II’s reign. 
 Lenin’s desire for a federative system in the Soviet Union, led to the creation of 
the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) on June 25, 1920, as part of the 
larger Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR).74 As an ASSR, the Tatar 
people were not granted the same independence as the Union Republics in Central Asia 
and the West and were still under Russian control.  However, korenizatsiia permitted 
cultural and political freedoms that the Tatars had not experienced in decades.  Tatar was 
declared the official language of the ASSR, which allowed the Soviets in Moscow to 
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spread socialism in the local language of the Tatars.75  Tatars were promoted to all levels 
of the Soviet party, within both the Tatar ASSR, as well as central state organs in the 
capital.76  Affirmative action allowed the Tatars to achieve equal status with the Russians 
under the banner of socialism.  Unfortunately, the resentment created by these polices 
within the Russian population, resulted in the end of korenizatsiia following Lenin’s 
death in 1924.  Stalin reversed many of the liberal nationalist policies of the 1920s, and 
replaced them with anti-nationalist rhetoric that would endure for the following decades. 
 Stalin had always been an opponent to Lenin’s “Greater Danger Principle,” never 
fully believing that the Russians should be labeled as a chauvinistic ethnicity and that 
local nationalism was not a threat to Communism.77  After coming to power, he abolished 
the policies of korenizatsiia, and with it, the idea of the Soviet Union as an affirmative 
action state.78  He also reestablished the importance of the Russian ethnicity and 
culture.79  Lenin had purposefully downplayed Russian nationalism, for free that it would 
give the Soviet Union the appearance of a colonial empire.  By reversing this measure, 
Stalin enacted a period of indirect Russification across the Soviet Union.  With no 
affirmative action restrictions left on the Russian nationality, it quickly took on a position 
of superiority amongst the different ethnicities.  For Stalin and other Soviet leaders, the 
meaning of a Soviet identity became congruous with the Russian identity.  Therefore 
many of the policies that were meant to unify and standardize the territories of the Soviet 
Union, also forced the Russian culture and identity on the non-Russian communities.  
While the original intention may not have been forced Russification of the Tatars and 
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other groups, it was undeniably one of the outcomes of Stalin’s abolition of the “Greater 
Danger Principle.” 
 One of the first actions taken by Stalin was to instill bilingualism in all of the 
federal districts of the Soviet Union.  While Tatar and other titular languages were not 
banned outright, it quickly became clear which language was the most important.  The 
lack of state support and the difficulty of non-Russian speakers gaining employment 
caused a linguistic shift to Russian in the decades of Soviet rule.80  The Tatar language 
itself was streamlined by Soviet edict.  From the Turkic linguistic branch, Tatar is based 
on Arabic script.  This was changed to Latin and then Cyrillic, under the pretense of 
standardizing and modernizing the language.  Instead, the change in language script 
inhibited Tatars from reading older documents, essentially separating them from their 
historical precursors.81 
 To replace this loss of Tatar history, Soviet historiographers wrote a new narrative 
that legitimized the state’s actions and justify the Tatars’ position in the Soviet Union.  In 
the new Soviet narrative, the Tatar ethnicity was described as less developed than the 
Russians, and in need of Soviet assistance in order to progress. This claim was supported 
by the idea that the Kazan Khanate was economically and political weaker than the 
Muscovite state, framing the events of 1552 as constructive for Tatar advancement.82  
While Tatar intellectuals naturally objected to this rendering of their history, it was the 
official Soviet view until after Stalin’s death in 1953. After that, limited claims were 
                                                
80 Grenoble, 71. 
81 Grenoble, 70. 
82 Edward Lazzerini, “Tatarovedenie and the New Historiography in the Soviet Union,” Slavic Review 40, 
no. 4 (1981): 628. 
    28
permitted that placed Muscovy and the Kazan Khanate on equal developmental stages.83 
Still, the Soviet recasting of Tatar history was yet another attempt by the state to oversee 
the maturation of their national identity. 
 A final and most obvious impact of Soviet policy on Tatar national identity 
involved its Muslim culture. This presented an interesting dilemma for the Soviets who 
feared a pan-Islamic threat. Religion was naturally in opposition to the communist 
ideology, but Islam was considered more deadly than Orthodoxy, since the former was 
believed to have no connections with traditional Russian culture.84  To combat Islam, 
atheistic propaganda was disseminated, especially in Tatarstan, which had historically 
been the center of Islamic movements in Russia.  Publications were circulated in the 
Tatar language that extolled the merits of atheism.85  In a more direct attack, mosques and 
educational institutions were closed and dismantled, drastically reducing the number of 
Islamic structures in Tatarstan.86  While attempts to eradicated Islam were not completely 
successful, this aspect of the Soviet nationalist policies was the most damaging to 
national identity. Its legacy continues to be felt in Islamic culture throughout the 
Federation, as well as the former Republics. 
 These policies of sporadic Russification and anti-Islamic propaganda continued 
even after Stalin’s death.  As a result of this, fewer and fewer non-Russians held 
prominent positions in the Communist party.87  A population increase and resulting 
migration of Russians created several instances where Russians were the major ethnicity 
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in many of the non-Russian republics, including Tatarstan.88  This would have major 
effects on Tatar national identity during the periods of perestroika and post-communist 
Russia.  This liberalizing period provided the first opportunity for the Tatars to fully 
control their national development since the time of Ivan the Terrible. While labeling the 
Soviet Union, as a colonizing state is a confusion of terms, the fragmentation and dilution 
of Tatar national identity because of Soviet policies is unquestionable. 
 The legacy of imperial and Soviet rule over the Tatars has left a visible mark on 
this group’s identity.  What started as a purely expansionary, colonizing mission under 
Ivan the Terrible, evolved into a more sophisticated modernizing movement under the 
subsequent imperial and Soviet leaders.  While at times the policies of these different 
empires had the appearance of oppression, specifically in relation to anti-Islam 
campaigns, the overall goal of the Russians was never to subjugate the Tatars.  Rather, it 
was to create a stable, cohesive state that was comprised of different ethnicities.  Some 
rulers were more aggressive in trying to integrate the Tatars, especially during the Soviet 
period.  The rapid assimilation that occurred under the Soviet Union resulted in entire 
generations of Tatars who had more cultural in common with their Russian neighbors 
than with the Tatars of the imperial or khanate periods.  This inability of the Tatars to 
extract themselves from the culture and history of the Russians has been a major obstacle 
to modern identity construction in the region, and is only further exacerbated by the 
current political relationship between the Tatarstan Republic and the new Russian state. 
The Post-Soviet Political Context of Tatar Identity 
 As the Soviet Union moved quickly to dissolution at the beginning of the 1990s, 
drastic political reshuffling was occurring across the Russian territory.  Leaders of 
                                                
88 Kappeler, 383. 
    30
ethnocentrically dominated territories began asserting more and more independence from 
the central government apparatuses.  In places that had long felt dominated by the 
Russians, like the tumultuous Caucasus, talk of complete breaks with the Russians were 
widespread.  The Soviet Republics in the Baltic were leaders in the sovereignty 
movement, as some of the earliest states to declare complete independence.89  This was 
eventually followed in Ukraine and the Southern Caucasus states.  Areas that had either 
been absorbed by the Russians took advantage of the political chaos to reassert their 
power.  The Tatar leader and future Tatarstan president, Mintimer Shaimiev, saw the 
opportunity for the Tatars to regain their lost control and prestige in the territory.  
  In August 1990, Shaimiev issued a decree of sovereignty for the Tatarstan 
Republic.90  The wide number of areas that were following similar independent actions 
bolstered Shaimiev’s actions.  However, unlike the republics in Central Asia and Eastern 
Europe, Tatarstan did not completely break away from the Russian state. President Boris 
Yeltsin was able to maintain certain territories as parts of the Russian Federation, in 
exchange for large political and economic concessions.  On February 15, 1994, Yeltsin 
and Shaimiev signed a bilateral agreement between Russia and Tatarstan, which formally 
recognized the latter’s sovereignty.91  While many other territories were given similar 
political treatments, the agreement with Tatarstan was notable for the large degree of 
economic and political freedom accorded it.  For example, Tatarstan has its own foreign 
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policy, which in some cases does not coincide with official Russian positions.92  For the 
greater part of the 1990s, Tatarstan was a near separate entity from the central Russian 
state.  The twenty-first century, however, has seen new developments in the relationship 
between Kazan and Moscow. 
 Recent political restructuring in the Russian Federation under Vladimir Putin and 
his presidential successor Dmitrii Medvedev has threatened much of the sovereignty once 
enjoyed by the peripheral territories.  This diminishing of independence, coupled with 
growing violence in other primarily Islamic areas of Russia as well as a highly publicized 
international context of an extreme “Islamic” terrorist threat, have forced the Tatarstan 
leaders to move away from a purely nationalist policy, lest Tatarstan follow the same 
historical trajectory as Chechnya.  Instead, Shaimiev and others have advanced 
cooperation with the Russian ethnic majority as a way to maintain good relations with the 
Russian central authority in Moscow and to hold onto to their political independence. 
 Due to the political situation in the Russian Federation, and the complex 
relationships between the central and peripheral governments, the Tatars face an 
interesting challenge in reconstructing their national identity.  The tendency for groups 
emerging from oppressive rule is to pursue strongly nationalistic, ethnocentric 
campaigns, with the purpose of aggrandizing the past and inflating the intrinsic coherence 
of the particular ethnicity.  The Tatars however cannot have a nationalist campaign 
because of the political control that the Russian government still has over their territory.  
With the new freedoms of the 1990s then the Tatars created a national myth that 
enhanced the idea of the vitality of Tatar ethnicity without completely disparaging the 
Russian influence.   
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 This balancing act between the Tatar self-promotion and appeasement of the 
Russians is visible throughout much of Tatar society.  Its signs can be seen in the 
construction of the Kul Sharif mosque, the preservation of the Bolghar capital city ruins, 
and the commemoration of the poet Ğabdulla Tuqay.  While not the only examples of 
modern Tatar memory, these three sites particularly highlight the intentions of the Tatars 
to overwrite their history, without depicting the Russians as an entirely negative force.  
What emerges then is a pattern of placing the Tatars and Russians on an equal level, so 
that the Tatars are no longer represented as subservient to the group that has had political 
and economic control over them for centuries.   
 These kinds of sites figure not infrequently in the efforts of newly independent 
states to recast their identities, religious buildings, historical ruins, and literary figures 
representing mainstays of such efforts around the world.   In Tatarstan, however, these 
three selected sites illustrate the limits of such self-aggrandizing possibilities.   In each 
instance, the Tatars not only promote the superiority or importance of their own 
community, they also represent the Russian presence in their national memory in a 
generally positive manner that is surprising in a post-colonial context.   
 The selection of Kul Sharif as a site of memory for the Tatars is the most obvious 
choice.  As will be discussed later, its construction was one of the first actions undertaken 
by the quasi-independent Tatar state.  Its importance in the modern Tatar identity is 
undeniable.  The other two sites, Bolghar are Tuqay are less obvious, but still important 
Tatar cultural markers.  Bolghar represents a development of a new, more faltering Tatar 
historiography that helps to diminish the Tatar’s embarrassment of being conquered by 
another Empire.  Tuqay as a person demonstrates the cultural reawakening that occurred 
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in Kazan at the beginning of the twentieth century.  His importance as a site of memory, 
however, is more prevalent in how the Tatars choose to commemorate his life and work, 
which manages to balance a nationalist sentiment within the confines of a Russian sphere.  
There are naturally, several other sites that depict the modern form of Tatar memory, but 
these three best demonstrate the inescapable influence Russia has had over Tatar 
development.  
 In studying these sites, a pattern emerges regarding memory construction in 
Tatarstan.  All three champion an idea of multiculturalism in Tatarstan, specifically the 
link between the Russians and the Tatars.  The reality of the Tatar cultural domination by 
the Russians left them with few opportunities to be nothing more than a sub-ethnicity 
within the Empire and later the Soviet Union.  With the newly afforded freedoms that the 
post-Soviet era has granted them, it is reasonable that the Tatars would want to transform 
their history to a more patriotic, pro-Tatar concept.  However, instead of pursuing a 
purely nationalistic message with their memory construction, the Tatars chose a more 
nuanced approach to their past.  The current political realities in the Russian Federation 
play a major role in how the Tatars were able to form their new national identity. 
 When the Soviet Union collapsed, the Tatarstan government was presented with 
an opportunity to create an ethnic identity as something other than a colonized territory of 
the Russian state.  The transformation that the Tatars had undergone through Russian 
rule, however, was a formidable obstacle to reconstruction.  In the years following 1991, 
Tatar leaders reshaped their territories’ history, downplaying the role of the Russians. 
They constructed physical representations of Tatarstan’s new identity, a deployment of 
memory construction that, Pierre Nora notes, is intended to create “the illusion of 
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eternity.”93  These monuments harkened back to pre-Russian era Tatarstan, and helped to 
emphasize the separation of the Tatar identity from the Russian one.  Prominent examples 
of sites of memory within the Republic include the Kul-Sharif mosque, the Bolghar ruins, 
and the museums devoted to the Tatar poet Tuqay.  These entities are testaments to the 
new memories and history that the Tatars have created for themselves, and demonstrate 
the way in which established groups can refashion their own historical identities. 
 The remainder of this paper will focus on the history and meaning of the 
aforementioned sites of memory.  A deeper examination of their importance in Tatar 
memory construction reveals how the modern Tatars choose to view their past and its 
impact on the present.  In the end, it is apparent that the Russians had and continue to 
have a major impact on how the Tatars choose to remember and represent their culture in 
this modern era.    
Kul Sharif Mosque 
 Located within the Kazan Kremlin walls, this is the largest mosque in the Russian 
Federation, a state with a significant Muslim population.94  Its construction in the late 
1990s was an obvious example of the Tatars’ reconstruction of their history.  As a 
dominantly Islamic people, the Tatars place huge cultural significance in the mosques as 
a major site of Islamic memory.  However, centuries of Russian rule had all but erased 
the physical representations of Islam in the Tatar culture.  Constructing this mosque was 
a calculated physical and symbolic attempt to erase the religious restrictions that had 
once been placed on the Tatar people. However, the Kul Sharif does not only stand for 
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the reconstruction of Islam in Tatar society.  It has also taken on a highly multicultural 
meaning in the national memory of Tatarstan, specifically in relation to Russian 
Orthodoxy.  The history of its construction, demonstrates a concerted effort in Tatar 
society to create an identity that leaves room for the traditional Islamic background of the 
Tatars, as well as the recent Russian religious presence. 
 After invading the Kazan Khanate in 1552, one of Ivan the Terrible’s first actions 
was to raze the capital’s largest mosque.  In a highly symbolic move, an Orthodox 
Church named the Blagoveshchenskii Sobor was erected on the site where the old 
mosque once stood.95  This was an attempt to demoralize the Islamic Tatar people, and 
reinforce the inferior position of the Tatars to the conquering Russians.  Additionally, the 
razing of the Kul Sharif mosque marked the beginning of a centuries-long campaign to 
convert them to Russian Orthodoxy and erase the existence of Islam in the collective 
Tatar memory.  The destruction of Kazan’s largest mosque, was the beginning of a 
centuries long campaign of the Russians and Soviets attempting to diminish the position 
of Islam in its newly acquired territory. 
 Anti-Islamic policies were a common action carried out by the imperial tsars and 
Soviet leaders. During Ivan’s reign, a staggeringly high number of mosques were 
destroyed and often replaced with Orthodox cathedrals.96  The Tatar landscape was 
quickly transformed to mirror the religion of its Russian conquerors.  Prior to Ivan’s 
invasion, Tatar historians report, five mosques stood within the Kazan Kremlin’s walls.97  
The practice of constructing cathedrals and limiting the number of mosques in conquered 
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territories endured throughout the imperial and communist rule over the Tatars.  With a 
growing Muslim population as the Russian Empire swept through the Central Asian 
region, harsher limitations on Islamic religious architecture were enacted.  Many state 
officials called for a complete ban on mosque construction.  Often, the Russian state 
would sponsor eradication of still-working mosques.  Between 1738 and 1745, 418 
mosques were dismantled in the district of Kazan alone.98  Destruction of mosques was 
also not uncommon in the Soviet period, especially after Stalin began rolling back 
Lenin’s more tolerant nationalities policy.  In the late 1920s and 1930s, mosques 
throughout the Union were closed or destroyed in an effort to eradicate religious 
sentiment amongst the Muslim population.99 While the destruction of mosques was not 
common in the latter parts of Soviet rule, the political and social atmosphere remained 
unfriendly towards the practicing of the Islamic religion. 
 Despite these harsh anti-mosque policies a small number of mosques escaped 
destruction, even in the city of Kazan.100  At different times, Russian rulers were actually 
responsible for the preservation of these buildings.  Primarily, Catherine II’s religious 
tolerance edict of 1773, which outlawed the destruction of mosques, was instrumental in 
preserving the few Islamic structures that still survived.101  The construction of new 
mosques was also allowed at several points during imperial and Soviet rule, most 
noticeably during the early, more liberal Soviet era of the 1920s.102  These intermittent 
periods of religious tolerance were one of the factors that helped preserve Islam in Tatar 
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culture.  However, after centuries of Russian rule, Islam in Tatarstan was permeated with 
Russian Orthodoxy, either through the construction of churches, conversions, or simply 
the migration of Russians to the territory.  This relationship between Islam and 
Orthodoxy, whether welcome or not, had a profound effect on how the Tatars chose to 
reconstruct their religious memory in the post-1991 Russian Federation.  
 When religious freedoms were fully restored in Russia following the events of 
1991, there was a strong movement amongst the Tatar to create a national identity around 
their Islamic heritage.  The mosque is an obvious symbol to demonstrate and promote 
Islamic revival in Tatar society, and following the fall of the Soviet Union, mosques once 
again became a dominant presence in the Tatar landscape.  In an effort to fully 
reconstruct their Islamic roots, the Tatars turned their attention to the Kazan Khanate and 
its appearance prior to Ivan the Terrible’s invasion.  Even though the citizens of the 
Khanate have little historically in common with modern Tatars, the fact this period was 
absence of a Russian influence, made it an obvious choice for promoting Islamic 
memories.  From here, the proposal to erect the Kul Sharif mosque emerged, a 
replacement of the mosque destroyed by Ivan during his invasion.103  As a site of 
memory, the Kul Sharif mosque represents the formation of a collective Tatar religious 
identity in their modern cultural reality.  
 In 2005 the construction of the Kul Sharif mosque and its inauguration were 
complete, coinciding with the millennial celebration of Kazan’s own construction.104  Its 
impressive structure dominates the Kazan skyline, towering over many of the other 
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buildings in the Kremlin.  Much smaller than other mosques found throughout the Middle 
East and South East Asia, the Kul Sharif has many architectural influences that are 
typically seen in the mosques of the former Ottoman Empire.  The slender design of the 
minarets and the surrounding domes mirror those of the famous Blue Mosque in Istanbul, 
although on a smaller scale.   
 Despite its likeness to mosques of the ancient world, however, there is a certain 
modernistic feel to the mosque’s structure.  Its clean and even shape and its simple colors 
of white and blue, make it impossible to mistake for anything but a recent construction.  
This makes juxtaposition between the mosque and the buildings that surround it all the 
more apparent.  The Kremlin fortress is ancient, and many of the structures that reside 
within its white walls have been there for centuries.  Immediately the eye is drawn to the 
mosque, which provides a bright contrast to the graying buildings that surround it.  At 
night, a ring of garish spotlights illuminates it, as if to ensure that even when nothing else 
is visible, the Kul Sharif still holds the eye of a passerby. 
To counteract its obvious appearance of being a recent construction, the mosque 
was furnished with a detailed historiography in order to justify its placement within the 
Kremlin. The name Kul Sharif comes from a Tatar soldier who died in battle against 
Ivan’s army.105  The message conveyed by this mosque then is one of defiance to the 
Russian state, an unwelcome presence in the Tatar land.  By referring back to their 
opposition to Russian encroachment, the Tatars wish to evoke feelings of independence 
and national sovereignty with the Kul Sharif mosque.  It is easy to simply interpret the 
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mosque as a defiant gesture against the Russian state.  The symbolic intricacies of the 
mosque do not stop there though. 
 During the construction of the Kul Sharif, many Tatar nationalists demanded that 
the Russian-built Blagoveshchenskii Sobor be torn down and replaced with the new 
mosque.  This would effectively undo Ivan’s earlier actions, and restore the mosque to its 
earlier location inside the Kremlin.  The proposal was overturned by the Tatar 
government and in a highly symbolic gesture, it was decided that the Kul Sharif mosque 
would be situated across from Ivan’s cathedral.106  Only a stone path currently separates 
these religious structures.  In the middle of this path is the recently constructed 
monument “To the Architects of Kazan.”   It is composed of two figures, one in 
traditional Russian dress who is holding building plans for an Orthodox church and 
another in traditional Tatar dress with the plans for a Khan palace.107  Clearly, this 
statuary is meant to reinforce the equal relationship between the two religious buildings.  
Still, the Kul Sharif is the obvious focal point, its minarets towering over the onion 
domes of the cathedral.  In comparison to the open location of the mosque, the cathedral 
is almost hidden amongst the other structures in the Kremlin.  It was permitted to remain 
in the Kremlin, but it is clear that it was never the intention to allow the cathedral to 
overshadow the mosque. 
 Despite the obvious privileging of the Kul Sharif mosque, Tatar leaders are quick 
to use the proximity of these two religious icons as an example of the Tatar community’s 
tolerance and acceptance of their Russian cousins. Tatars promote the idea that the Kazan 
Kremlin is the only location in the world where both a Christian and Islamic building can 
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be seen so close to one another.  When the current United States’ Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton visited Kazan in 2009, one of the most reported stops on her tour was the 
Kul Sharif.  “You are well known as someone who has fostered religious tolerance,” she 
said, congratulating the Tatars for their tolerant attitudes. “It's a wonderful example of 
what can be done if people work together. I am happy to be here in a place that models 
interfaith tolerance. So important in the world today.”108  Clinton’s acceptance of the 
Tatar’s tolerance narrative, demonstrates how successful their society has been in 
constructing a new memory about the Kazan Kremlin. 
 The Kul Sharif mosque and its construction represent the realities of the historical 
control by Russian imperial and Soviet authorities over Tatar development.  Despite the 
obviously nationalistic symbolism that comes with the construction of the Kul Sharif 
mosque, the overall message that it extends to its Tatar population is one of cooperation 
and acceptance of a strong Russian presence.  The fact that Shaimiev and other Tatar 
officials chose not to replace the Blagoveshchenskii Sobor with the new mosque, but 
instead erect the Kul Sharif close by, is a major indicator of their recognition of the 
important relationship between the Russians and the Tatars. 
 The history surrounding the construction of the Kul Sharif mosque reveals more 
complex meaning than simply an exertion of nationalistic desires.  While the mosque is 
meant to demonstrate the longevity and vitality of the Tatar ethnic identity and its ties 
with the Islamic religion, it also demonstrates the inextricable link between the Tatar and 
Russian cultures.  Centuries of colonial rule continue to mark the political relationship 
between Tatarstan and the central Russian government. Shaimiev and other elite Tatars 
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recognized the impossibility of completely erasing the Russian influence from a modern 
Tatar identity.  What the Kul Sharif mosque represents as a site of memory has dual 
meanings for the Tatars: their avowed ‘reclaiming’ of an ancient history, and their 
abiding connections with their Russian conquerors.  However, the Kul Sharif reconstructs 
this relationship with the Russians so as to create a more equal relationship, as opposed to 
that of the oppressor and the oppressed.  Herein lies the construction of memory that the 
Kul Sharif mosque demonstrates. 
Bolghar Capital City Ruins 
 A second prominent site of memory in the Tatarstan Republic is the ancient 
Bolghar capital.  Already a major tourist attraction for all residents of the Republic, the 
ruins go further than the Kul Sharif mosque to reinforce historical Tatar preeminence.  
Whereas the mosque is at least publicly intended to symbolize the peaceful coexistence 
of the Russian and Tatar ethnicities, the Bolghar ruins symbolize the strength of the Tatar 
ethnicity and its historical legacy.  How modern Tatars relate to this historical capital 
reveals a desire to connect their current national identity with the Tatar Empire of the 
past. The history of Bolghar and how that history has been embraced and reformed by the 
Tatars is another instance of memory construction to legitimize their current political 
position within the Russian Federation. 
 From the 800s to 1236, the Khanate of Bolghar was a major force in the Volga 
region.   The Khanate possessed significant territorial holdings, and in 922 it became an 
important Islamic state.  Its power as an empire was removed, however, in 1236 when the 
invading Mongol horde captured the territory.109  This led to a complete restructuring of 
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the Khanate’s political power system, as the Mongols removed Bolghar elites from 
power.110  Following its conquest of the Khanate of Bolghar, the Mongol army spread 
throughout Kievan Rus’, capturing a large portion of the territory by 1240.111  Two 
centuries of Mongol dominance in the area ensued, which only began to recede at the end 
of the fifteenth century.  At this time, the Mongol Golden Horde collapsed and a 
restructuring of the Muscovite and Tatar territories began. 
 The Kazan Tatars had been a major ethnic portion of the Bolghar state during its 
several centuries of existence.112  With the dissolution of the Golden Horde, the Kazan 
Tatars had the opportunity to become a major ruling force in the area.  The Khanate of 
Bolghar had been nearly destroyed through 200 years of Mongol rule, and it was not 
difficult for the Kazan Tatars to wrest power from this former powerful entity.  Ulu 
Mohammed officially founded the city of Kazan at the end of the fifteenth century, 
establishing the Kazan Tatars’ dominance of the former Khanate of Bolghar.113 
 Ulu Mohammed saw the Khanate of Kazan as a natural extension of the Mongol 
Empire.  He claimed to be part of the Mongol khan lineage, arrogating to himself the 
legitimacy to continue the practices of the Golden Horde.114  As such, the princes of 
Muscovy were expected to pay tribute or vykhod to the rulers of the Kazan Khanate.  The 
historical record suggests that the Muscovite princes honored this agreement, and did in 
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fact pay a tribute to the successors to the Golden Horde until Ivan the Terrible conquered 
Kazan in 1552.115  The short-lived recognition of the Kazan Khanate as a successor to the 
Golden Horde would later inform the argument that the Bolghar state was the precursor 
to the modern-day incarnation of the Tatarstan Republic. 
Numerous aspects of the Bolghar Khanate’s existence were reinterpreted by the 
Kazan Tatars to legitimize their claim as not only successors of the Golden Horde but of 
the equally influential Bolghar Empire.  The territorial boundaries that the Khanate of 
Bolghar shared with the Kazan Khanate and later the Tatarstan Republic, as well as its 
state religion of Islam, are just two prominent examples of their connection.  During the 
the tsarist and Soviet eras, Tatar elites attempted to justify this relationship between their 
state and that of the Bolghars through various means.  A popular method in the twentieth 
century was to novelize the history of the Bolghars during the Golden Horde’s 
occupation.  This allowed Tatar literary figures to bolster the position of the Bolghars, at 
times claiming that they were an important buffer against further Mongol encroachments 
on Europe.116 
Despite the persistent protests of Tatar scholars, Russian historians, particularly in 
the Soviet era, attempted to downplay any possible connections between the Bolghars 
and the Tatars.  The Russians were in support of this counter-narrative for two notable 
reasons.  During the Russian Imperial period, it was common to link the Tatars with the 
Mongols, which led to the period of Mongol rule being misnamed the “Tatar yoke.”117  
By linking the Mongols with the Tatars, as equal oppressors of the Russian people, the 
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Muscovite rulers could justify invading the Khanate of Kazan.  If the Kazan Tatars were 
seen as the successors to the Bolghars, then their justification of retribution would no 
longer apply.  Another reason for the Russians to discredit the link between Kazan and 
Bolghar was the growing independence in the Tatarstan territory during the twentieth 
century.118  To establish legitimacy as a sovereign territory, the Tatar intellectual class 
argued for a connection with the ancient Bolghar state.  It was politically viable for the 
Soviets to dispute this idea, and thereby dampen any independence movements among 
the Kazan Tatars. 
 In spite of Russian scholars’ attempts to discredit the importance of Bolghar in 
Tatar history, many Tatar figures have championed the idea of a direct evolution from the 
Bolghars to the Tatars.  One way, in which they defend this position, is by claiming that 
the Bolghars influenced the Mongols’ cultural and societal development.  Essentially they 
argue that the advanced Bolghar civilization did have an effect on the invading Mongol 
hordes, as they assumed the traditions of the Bolghars.119  Thus, the evolution from a 
Bolghar state to a Tatar one becomes a more feasible argument.   
Whether or not the historical evidence supports the theory of a succession from 
the Khanate of Bolghar to the Tatarstan Republic is irrelevant.  What is important is how 
the Tatars interpret their relationship to the Bolghar Empire.  By linking themselves with 
this ancient state, the Tatars create more historical legitimacy for their dominance in the 
Volga area.  The modern-day treatment of Bolghar by the Tatars further illuminates their 
construction of a historical tradition that relates the two Khanates of Bolghar and Kazan. 
Unlike the Kul Sharif mosque, however, Bolghar is not meant to establish a balance 
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between the Russians and the Tatars.  Instead, the site represents a reconstruction of Tatar 
memory that helps to legitimize its political existence in the present. 
When the Tatars were pushing for increased independence from the central 
Russian government in the 1990s, the link between the Khanate of Kazan and Bolghar 
was stressed.  The Tatar website dedicated to the Bolghar archeological site discusses this 
link and emphasizes the ancient status of the Bolghars.120  Even the official website of the 
Republic of Tatarstan discusses the link between Bolghar and the present day 
Tatarstan.121  Its simplified discussion of Tatar history portrays Bolghar as the precursor 
to the Kazan Khanate, and again highlights the territorial and religious similarities that 
these two historical entities shared.  It is a clear intent by the Tatars to create a memory of 
the past that recognizes an historical evolution from the powerful Bolghar state to the 
Khanate of Kazan, thereby further legitimizing Tatarstan’s historical claim to statehood.  
This campaign of memory formation has been successfully carried in Tatarstan.  In fact, 
the lines between the Bolghar tribe and the Tatars have become so blurred by modern-day 
memory constructions that many Tatars consider themselves ethnically Bolghar. 
The complexities surrounding the ethnic identity of Tatar are many.  When the 
Mongol hordes invaded Kievan Rus’, their name was interchangeable with Tatar.  It is a 
common practice today to refer to the Tatars as the invading force that overran the 
Russians for two centuries.122  The designation Tatar was ubiquitous for all Turkic tribes 
by the thirteenth century, historians noting that groups like the Karluk, Turkmen, 
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Kashgaris, and Kucharis were referred to as Tatars.123  Meanwhile, the Bolghar ethnic 
identity was well documented in the Volga region, the very same territory where the 
modern inception of the Tatar state is located.  By linking themselves with the Bolghar 
state, the Tatars deny any connection with the Mongols that invaded the Russian territory. 
While Tatar historians do not deny the likelihood that Mongols and Tatars intermarried 
during the invasion period, the supposition still exists that some form of Bolghar ethnic 
identity was preserved and transferred through successive Tatar generations.  During the 
Tatar cultural revival of the nineteenth century, Tatars who added the word “Bulgari” to 
their names promoted this idea.124  
This claim of ethnic connection between the Bolghars and the Tatars further 
legitimizes the claims of an evolutionary link between two ancient empires.  Tatars 
clearly want to distance themselves from the imagery of invading Mongol troops, and 
instead associate themselves with the powerful Bolghar state that had well-formed trade 
relations with the princes of Kievan Rus’.  Here again is the theme of an equal 
relationship between the Russians and the Tatars.  If the Tatars are believed to be a 
successor to the Bolghars, than they historically shared strong relationships with Russian 
rulers.  The Republic of Tatarstan website that deals with the issue of the Tatar/Bolghar 
ethnic divide states the following:  
Knowledge of and respect for the history of both the Russian and Bulgar/Tatar 
 ethnic groups is bound to add to mutual respect, confidence, and tolerance in 
 building new interethnic relations. While refusing to give in to ethnocentrism, a 
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 people having a glorious centuries-old history cannot but speak of its patriotic 
 sentiments.125 
  
This passage perfectly summarizes the modern day relationship Tatars have both with 
their ethnic identity and their relationship with the Russians. 
 This recasting of the Tatar identity as a successor to the Bolghars is not entirely 
without historical basis.  As formal protests to the Russian government from the Bulgaran 
National Congress, an organization which promotes awareness of Bolghar history and 
preservation, attests, a study released in the Soviet era relates the misnomer of identifying 
the inhabitants of the Tatarstan territory as “Tatars.”126  There is a movement within 
Tatarstan, mostly championed by the Bulgaran National Congress, to change the 
identification of Tatar back to Bolghar.  The implications of this renaming campaign are 
many.  If successful, it would further the Tatar attempt to transform their national 
memory into something more inspiring than that of colonial subjugation at the hands of 
the Russians.  What this renaming movement and arguments about Tatar ethnicity 
ultimately show, however, is the significance that Bolghar and its history have in Tatar 
memory and culture. 
 When present-day Tatars speak of Bolghar and its ruins, there is a defiant feeling 
of reverence in their discussion.  For many of the Tatars, visiting Bolghar has the same 
religious and cultural significance as the yearly hajj to Mecca has for all Muslims.  
Bolghar’s conversion to Islam in 922, marking its status as an Islamic empire that the 
Kazan Khanate would later assume, holds significant meaning for the largely Muslim 
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Tatars.  The preservation of the few remaining buildings in Bolghar testifies to the weight 
the Tatar community places on including the Bolghar past in modern Tatar memory.  
However, this modern day veneration of Bolghar was notably absent from the Tatar past.  
It was a Russian tsar, Peter the Great, who first proposed the idea to preserve the 
buildings of Bolghar.  Sadly the surrounding Tatars were largely uninterested in any 
preservation projects, and for this reason a large number of the Bolghar structures that 
were present in the eighteenth century have disintegrated into ruins.127  The official 
museum of the Bolghar region was not opened until 1969.128  Attitudes have obviously 
changed towards this territory, as Bolghar has come to hold a more significant position in 
Tatar national memory. 
 What the commemoration of the Bolghar Empire demonstrates is the new 
multicultural approach the Tatars are following in regards to their memory constructions.  
As the few remaining icons of a faded empire that pre-dated the Kazan Khanate, Bolghar 
has become an important aspect of the modern Tatar psyche.  The claims that the Kazan 
Khanate is a political descendant of the Bolghar state add legitimacy to the sovereignty 
claims the Tatars make.  Tatarstan is more justifiable as a politically and economically 
independent state if it has an historical lineage that dates back centuries before the Kazan 
Khanate.  In addition to the political power it provides the Tatar state, Bolghar also fits 
the cultural mold that the Tatars have reconstructed for themselves. 
 As discussed with the construction of the Kul Sharif mosque, the intention of the 
Tatars is to recast their historical memory into an image that is more acceptable to them.  
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The portrayed linkage between the Tatars and the Bolghars invokes the memory of the 
economic relationship between the Russian princes and the Bolghar elites.  It also helps 
to distance the Tatars from their association with the invading Mongol hordes, a 
designation that has helped the Russians to recast the Tatars as villains and justify their 
expansion and domination in the region.  By claiming a shared heritage with the 
Bolghars, the Tatars escape any historical connection with the Mongols and reestablish a 
better relationship with the Russians that does not directly evoke the period of Russian 
rule from 1552 to 1991. 
Ğabdulla Tuqay 
 When communities are reconstructing national memory and myths, literary 
figures often play an important role.  Their cultural significance makes them the perfect 
conduits for advancing new myths about a particular group.  History is replete with 
examples of poets and writers ushering in a new sense of identity for various cultural and 
ethnic groups.  Sometimes it is not even the direct intention of the poet to craft a new 
collective memory for the people.  Instead, the work and life of these writers are often co-
opted, to fit the mold of whatever current construction is being undertaken.  The famous 
Tatar poet, Ğabdulla Tuqay, is an example of a writer being used to advance a particular 
cultural idea.  While Tuqay was an influential writer amongst the Tatars in his lifetime, 
his impact on the Tatars’ collective memory has only increased since his death.  The 
ways in which the Tatars commemorate Tuqay’s life demonstrate how his image is being 
used for a greater national purpose. Examining the numerous sites of memory that are 
dedicated to Tuqay will illuminate how Tatars perceive their nationality within the 
confines of a Russian state. 
    50
 Tuqay’s background makes him an ideal candidate for a national hero amongst 
the Tatars.  He was born in 1886 in a village not far from the city of Kazan called 
Kushlavych.  Orphaned at a young age, he was sent to live in Kazan with relatives in 
1889 and then later to Uralsk.  Here he toiled in menial positions for local newspapers, all 
the while writing the poetry for which he would eventually become famous.  He would 
eventually return to Kazan, and continue writing in the city he had always loved.  Sadly, 
as was common at the time, his difficult life led to various health complications.  Tuqay 
died in 1913, still a young man.129  Despite his short time spent writing, his position in 
Tatar literary history was incontestable. How Tatars have chosen to remember Tuqay, 
demonstrates the cultural balancing with the Russians that the Tatars have undergone 
during the modern memory construction. 
 The myth surrounding Tuqay that is now widely accepted in the Tatar community 
is not dissimilar to the legends about any other national literary figure.  The most obvious 
comparison is with the Russian icon, Aleksandr Pushkin, primarily because of the 
tendency for the Tatars to refer to Tuqay as the Tatar Pushkin.130  Pushkin, like Tuqay, 
had a relatively short life, but his superior status in the Russian collective cultural 
existence is unquestionable.  Many studies have been conducted about the 
commemoration and use of Pushkin to promote various Russia ideologies.  Pushkin has 
become so idealized in Russian society that it is impossible to differentiate between 
reality and creation when talking about the poet.  This is not uncommon for all poet or 
literary figures, as each are given a mythological status that almost completely eclipses 
                                                
129 “Gabdulla Tukay,” The City of Kazan, n.d. < http://www.kzn.ru/eng/page3297.htm> (5 February 2010). 
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their true identity.131  The various ways in which the Tatars have commemorated Tuqay 
demonstrate his ascension to mythical status in Tatar culture and his continued influence 
on national memory construction for this group. 
 Numerous cultural campaigns after Tuqay’s death were used to solidify his 
position in Tatar national memory.  First, the annual literary prize given out by the 
Tatarstan government for producers of high-quality work is named after Tuqay, 
furthering the poet’s association with literary accomplishment.132  The city of Kazan 
contains numerous monuments to the poet.  The most prominent example is one of main 
roads in Kazan, which stretches through the city center and its outskirts and bears the 
name of the famous poet.  Important dates in Tuqay’s life are another instance of 
mythicization by the Tatars.  His birthday is considered a national holiday; the 120th 
anniversary was celebrated in 2006.133  This national recognition leaves little question as 
to the high position Tuqay has been assigned in the Tatar national consciousness.  
 Aside from the above examples of Tuqay’s prevalence in Tatar society, the two 
most visible monuments to the memory of Tuqay are the museums that commemorate 
different stages in his life.  The first is a museum dedicated to his childhood in 
Kushlavych. The second is a museum that contains many documents and items that are 
connected to Tuqay’s adult life; this museum is located in one of the more populated 
sections of Kazan.  Though the aspects of each museum represent two different periods in 
his life, the overall collective theme that they both produce remains the same. That is, 
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132 “Gabdulla Tukay Literary Museum,” Department of the National Museum of the Republic of Tatarstan, 
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Tuqay’s history, whether real or imagined, is the quintessential story of the Tatar people 
and culture.  These two museums, therefore, are the most significant examples of Tatar 
identity construction in relation to the poet Tuqay. 
 The village of Kushlavych is not far from Kazan, and is a popular tourist 
attraction for Tatars across the Republic.  It is possible to tour the small domicile where 
Tuqay was born and spent the first two-years of his life.  The village house in arranged in 
the traditional Tatar style, with various outfits, cooking tools, and other equipment 
displayed throughout.  Plaques are present everywhere to commemorate the existence of 
Tuqay, lest the viewer forget for a second in whose home they are standing.  
 Interestingly, the primary language is inverted in this village.  Though the 
Tatarstan Republic is a bilingual society where most signs and official documents are 
written in both Russian and Tatar, Russian is the clearly dominant language of the two.  
In Kushlavych however, Tatar is spoken almost exclusively.  The guides, who take 
curious tourists through Tuqay’s brief childhood home, speak only Tatar.  All the 
aforementioned plaques show the Tatar text first, with a Russian translation in a lower, 
less important position.  Whether this prevalence of Tatar language is intentional or not, it 
reflects the national and ethnic pride that the Tatars have imposed on Tuqay’s memory. 
 Along with the preserved village house, a museum dedicated to Tuqay was also 
built in Kushlavych.  This two-story building is a noticeable contrast to the rundown 
houses that are ubiquitous in the village.  It dominants the landscape and the large statue 
of an adult Tuqay that stands before the museum serves as a remainder to the grand 
nature of the man that the building is meant to represent.  Inside is a seemingly haphazard 
collection of artifacts from Tuqay’s life, primarily from the periods spent living in Kazan.  
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Personal correspondences, private journal writings, pictures, all the remains of Tuqay’s 
life are preserved in small glass cases.  His poetry is also prominently displayed 
throughout the building, in the original Tatar.  A truly astounding event, which surely 
most be a requirement for all tour groups that enter the building, is when the guide reads 
an excerpt from one of Tuqay’s most famous poems and Tatarstan’s unofficial national 
anthem, “Oh My Mother Tongue”: 
Oh, beloved native language 
Oh, enchanting mother tongue! 
You enabled my search for knowledge 
Of the world, since I was young 
As a child, when I was sleepless 
Mother sung me lullabies 
And my grandma told me stories 
Through the night, to shut my eyes 
:Oh, my tongue! 
You have been always 
My support in grief and joy 
Understood and cherished fondly 
Since I was a little boy 
In my tongue, I learned with patience 
To express my faith and say 
"Oh, Creator! Bless my parents 
Take, Allah, my sins away!"134 
 
This poem’s popularity in Tatarstan is unsurprising.  It praises the value of the Tatar 
language and references the importance of Islam, two themes that are vital in Tatar 
memory construction.  With the poem and all that is associated with it, nationalist 
sentiments are inescapable in Tuqay’s ancestral home of Kushlavych.  Clearly, the 
museum’s creators intended to incite cultural pride and reverence within all visitors to the 
village. 
                                                
134 “Ğabdulla Tuqay,” Academic dictionaries and encyclopedias, n.d. <	  http://en.academic.ru 
/dic.nsf/enwiki/325070> (1 February 2010). 
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 The other major museum dedicated to Tuqay is located in Kazan.  Built in 1986, 
this museum certainly has a more organized method of constructing the myth of Tuqay 
than its sister building in Kushlavych.  Kazan was a major influence in Tuqay’s life, the 
place where Tuqay began his political education. Shortly after moving to Kazan, Tuqay 
became acquainted with Kh.Yamashev, who is known as the first Tatar Bolshevik.135 
Through this connection, Tuqay was introduced to many young, radical thinkers living in 
Kazan, and this was heavily reflected in the writings he produced at this time.  Poems like 
"What does not suffice village people?" (1912), "Hopes of the people …" (1913), and 
“Oppression” (1911), had obvious social reform messages.136 Sadly, Tuqay’s associations 
would bring him retribution from the Russian state.  The repressive nature of the Russian 
state at this time, in response to the political upheaval that had spread throughout the 
country, was not a conducive atmosphere for political poetry.  Much of Tuqay’s work 
from the Kazan period, therefore, was not published.137 
 Despite the political hardships that befell Tuqay while he worked and lived in 
Kazan, his love of the city never waned.  It is unsurprising then that the most famous 
Tuqay museum is located there.  The building itself is an impressive structure that even 
outshines the corresponding museum in Kushlavych.  A requisite destination for all 
visiting Tatars within a short distance from Kazan, its national importance is difficult to 
underestimate.  The museum contains personal effects, letters, and many other items that 
one would expect to find in a museum devoted to an individual.  Perhaps its most 
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important piece, however, is Tuqay’s death mask.  Tatars who lived generations after 
their national poet died can see what the face of their hero looked like.  Very few Tatars 
who visit this museum neglect to retell their impressions of seeing this death mask, often 
as an evocation of cultural pride. 
 The universal tendency when societies commemorate national heroes is inflate 
their importance for the purpose of promoting nationalistic pride.  The Tatars have 
followed a pattern in commemorating Tuqay that is replicated in nearly every modern 
cohesive society.  The monuments dedicated to him, more than any previously mentioned 
site of memory, advance Tatar nationalism.  However, even with such a pure national 
monument as a famous poet, the Tatar collective memory still cannot completely 
disengage itself from its Russian colonial past.  Although the rhetoric surrounding Tuqay 
is couched in the promotion of Tatar ethnicity, - primarily in the argument that Tuqay 
helped to purify and standardize the Tatar language -, there is still a visible Russian 
cultural presence in the Tatar national myth of Tuqay.  When describing Tuqay to the 
unfamiliar, Tatars almost always refer to him as the “Tatar Pushkin,” rather than, say, a 
“Tatar Shakespeare.”  Even with a national symbol as pure as a literary figure, the Tatars 
cannot erase the reality of their relationship with Russia.   
 While the numerous museums and national holidays that commemorate Tuqay are 
meant to heighten national pride among the Tatars, these sites are never used to create 
nationalist hatred against the Russians.  Societies that were ruled by a different cultural 
entity often choose literary figures that attacked these supposed cultural oppressors. 
Tuqay, however, did not use his literary talent to encourage the Tatars to break 
connections with the Russians.  Instead, he openly recognized Tatar’s cultural place in a 
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Russian paradigm, and called for a Tatar cultural and national development that did not 
overstep these limitations.  An excerpt from one of Tuqay’s poems, further demonstrates 
his feelings towards the relationship between the Tatars and the Russians: 
 Here we are born, grew up, and here we shall meet the death hour, 
 Fate itself has bound us to this Russian land. 
 Be gone, you low creatures, you cannot confuse our sacred dreams! 
 We all aspire to the universal goal—we all want a free Russia.138 
 
Based on this poem and its discussion of a free Russia, the Tatar culture that Tuqay 
envisioned was never meant to exist outside the realm of Russian rule.   
 By adopting Ğabdulla Tuqay as a national and cultural hero, the Tatars 
demonstrate a very pointed message on how they have collectively chosen to view their 
history.  Tuqay, as evidenced by his writings, was accepting of the Tatar position in the 
Russian Empire, and called for a Tatar cultural revolution within these imposed 
boundaries.  His current position in modern Tatar collective memory denotes an 
acceptance amongst the Tatars that any cultural achievements they make, Tuqay is a 
continuation of a theme seen with the Kul Sharif mosque and the Bolghar ruins; that is, a 
desire for the Tatars to create a national identity, that obscures but does not completely 
deny Russia’s cultural and political influence on the territory’s development. 
Conclusion 
 The post-1991 era has proved to be a challenging time of memory construction 
for a society that for over four hundred years was prevented from completely controlling 
its own cultural development.  First the Russian imperialists, and then the Soviet 
communists, imposed their cultural and political values on the Tatars, sometimes in place 
of Tatar culture or parallel to it.  The ever-changing relationship between the Tatars and 
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the Russians prevented the Tatars from every fully becoming assimilated with their 
conquerors.  Even during the most repressive periods of Russian rule, the Tatars were 
able to hold onto their cultural memories.  However, over the centuries, Russian identity 
and memory has expectedly permeated into the Tatar existence.  When this community 
was finally afforded the ability to fully control its national memory, the Russian presence 
was an unavoidable dilemma.  This can clearly be seen in these three sites of memory, the 
Kul Sharif mosque, the Bolghar ruins, and Ğabdulla Tuqay. 
 What these three images reveal is a conflicted view of Tatar history.  Obviously, 
each site has its own nationalist purpose.  The Kul Sharif promotes the importance of 
Islam in Tatar culture and history.  Bolghar’s significance comes from its evocation of a 
mythic past in which the Tatars were a dominant force in the Volga region.  Finally, 
Ğabdulla Tuqay and his literary works are intended to illustrate the high levels Tatar 
culture can achieve.  All these sites are meant to elevate the status of a state that was long 
dominated by an unrelated group of people.  All three seek to diminish the presence of 
Russia in Tatar culture, while nonetheless acknowledging the unavoidable presence of 
Russian culture. 
 Were the preceding five hundred years a simple case of colonial rule of the Tatars 
by the Russians, a vastly different memory construction would have occurred in Tatarstan 
after the events of 1991.  In that case, a purer form of nationalistic memory would have 
emerged, with the sole purpose of casting off any evidence of Russian influence on the 
Tatar national identity.  However, since the relationship between the Tatars and the 
Russians has also been more intricate than that of pure colonizers and colonized, the 
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Tatars were faced with a unique challenge of how to construct a national memory in a 
post-independence atmosphere.   
 These sites of memory reveal an attempt by the Tatars to overcome the cultural 
and historical embarrassment of their defeat at the hands of the Russians in the sixteenth 
century, without completely casting off the impact Russia had on Tatar identity.  The Kul 
Sharif mosque, Bolghar ruins, and Ğabdulla Tuqay, all present the Tatars as cultural 
equals to the Russians and reinforce the theme of peaceful coexistence between these two 
differing cultures.  This form of post-independence memory construction, the 
simultaneous elevation of one nationality while acknowledging the presence of another, 
does not exist in many other cultures, even within the Russian Federation.  The 
uniqueness of Tatarstan in Russian cultural and political history has afforded them the 
opportunity to pursue an entirely new form of memory construction, as demonstrated in 
these different sites.  These three sites of memory reveal a complex picture of modern 
Tatar collective identity and memory. 
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